October 22, 1996

The Great Ape Project - International is founded on adherence to the Declaration on Great Apes. The answers given here work out some of the implications of this. Given the complexity of trying to apply these principles to individual great apes, these responses should not be regarded as final.

We welcome discussion and debate on such matters within GAP as well as between GAP supporters and others. We are happy to receive further questions, comments and criticism, although pressure of work means that we cannot guarantee to reply.

Section 1: About the Great Ape Project.

1.1 What is the Great Ape Project?
1.2 What is the Declaration on Great Apes?
1.3 How can I sign the Declaration on Great Apes?
1.4 How is the Great Ape Project organized, internationally and nationally?

Section 2: The Great Apes.

2.1 Who are the great apes?
2.2 Where do they live?
2.3 What are they like?

Section 3: Principles and Policies.

3.1 What is the 'Community of Equals'?
3.2 What is the Great Ape Project's policy on sanctuaries for non-human great apes?
3.3 What is the Great Ape Project's policy on great apes kept in zoos?
3.4 Would the Great Ape Project place any restrictions on great apes reproducing in sanctuaries?
3.5 Will you police apes in the wild to prevent them from harming one another?
3.6 How does the Great Ape Project envisage the 'protected territories' mentioned in the Declaration?
3.7 Does the Great Ape Project support the (re)-introduction of great apes into traditional habitats?
3.8 What is the Great Ape Project's attitude to teaching human language skills to other great apes?
3.9 What is the Great Ape Project's policy on the use of other great apes in advertising?
3.10 How should the interests of individual great apes be represented?
3.11 Isn't it a contradiction to seek 'human rights' for nonhuman apes?
3.12 Shouldn't we first try to ensure that the rights of all humans are respected?
3.13 How can the other great apes be 'persons'?

Section 4: Objections.

4.1 Aren't you just being speciesist on behalf of five species, instead of just one?
4.2 Rights without responsibilities?
4.3 You're anthropomorphizing them!
4.4 Granting rights to non-human great apes demeans humans!
4.5 What's the use of these ivory tower intellectual debates, when gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans are dying in large numbers, right now?
4.6 What have intellectual and language abilities got to do with moral consideration?
4.7 How important is the similarity between nonhuman and human great apes?

Section 5: Additional Information.

5.1 Who Supports the Declaration on Great Apes?
5.2 Who is Opposed to the Great Ape Project, and why?
5.3. What media have so far reported on the Great Ape Project?

Section 6. Supporting the Great Ape Project.

6.1 I want to help. How?
6.2 How can I find out more?
6.3 How can I get this FAQ?
6.4 Can I copy this FAQ?
6.5 Where do I contact the Great Ape Project?

Section 1: About the Great Ape Project

The Great Ape Project is an idea, a book, and an organization.

• The idea is radical but simple: to include the nonhuman great apes within the community of equals by granting them the basic moral and legal protection that only human beings currently enjoy.
• The book, which is the collective work of a group of scientists and scholars, is a multifaceted argument against the unthinking denial of fundamental rights to beings who are not members of our own species, but who quite evidently possess many of the characteristics that we consider morally important.
• The organization is a newly established international group founded to work for the removal of the nonhuman great apes from the category of property, and for their immediate inclusion within the category of persons.

We have produced A Declaration on Great Apes which tens of thousands of people have already signed to indicate their support. Please consider signing too.

We aim to achieve political change that establishes the legal right to life, the protection of individual liberty and freedom from torture for the nonhuman great apes. Our long-term goal is a United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Great Apes. When this historic result has been achieved, we will advocate the setting up of guarded territories so that chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orang-utans can continue to live as free beings in their own ways.

DECLARATION ON GREAT APES

We demand the extension of the community of equals to include all great apes: human beings, chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans. The community of equals is the moral community within which we accept certain basic moral principles or rights as governing our relations with each other and enforceable at law. Among these principles or rights are the following:

I. The Right to Life

The lives of members of the community of equals are to be protected. Members of the community of equals may not be killed except in very strictly defined circumstances, for example, self-defence.

II. The Protection of Individual Liberty

Members of the community of equals are not to be arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; if they should be imprisoned without due legal process, they have the right to immediate release. The detention of those who have not been convicted of any crime, or of those who are not criminally liable, should be allowed only where it can be shown to be for their own good, or necessary to protect the public from a member of the community who would clearly be a danger to others if at liberty. In such cases, members of the community of equals must have the right to appeal, either directly or, if they lack the relevant capacity, through an advocate, to a judicial tribunal.

III. The Prohibition of Torture

The deliberate infliction of severe pain on a member of the community of equals, either wantonly or for an alleged benefit to others, is regarded as torture, and is wrong.

If you are reading this on the Internet World Wide Web, click here. This is an on-line opportunity for you to add your name to our signatory database.

Alternatively, follow the GAP & You link for printable copies of the GAP Declaration for you to sign and send to us.

If you are reading this on paper, tear off the Declaration at the end, sign it, and post it to one of the addresses given in Section 6.

The Board of the Great Ape Project - International is responsible for coordination of the Project around the world. There are national groups in many countries. (See section 6) The Project already has tens of thousands of supporters across the globe.

Section 2: The Great Apes.

Until recently, western science knew relatively little about our fellow great apes. For instance, it was not until the 1960s that tool-use was recognised as a common feature of their lives in the wild.

We now know that all the members of the great ape family -- the chimpanzee (pan troglodytes), the bonobo (pan paniscus), the gorilla (gorilla gorilla), the orang-utan (pongo pygmaeus), and the human (homo sapiens) -- are highly intelligent, self-aware individuals, with complex emotional lives and strong social and family bonds.

In studies carried out with captive great apes, mostly in North America, gorillas, orang-utans, bonobos and chimpanzees have proved able to learn various components of human communication systems. They have demonstrated comprehension of extensive vocabularies, of signs, symbol and spoken English. They are able to produce simple sentences, to invent their own words, to express desires and feelings, make jokes, and even to lie.

It is ironic that humans only really began to recognise and appreciate the capacities of the other great apes when they went as far as to learn elements of human language.

More Details

The other great apes are members of four species (basic taxonomic information and a chart of relationships can be found in Byrne, 1995, 17-27):

(1) Gorilla gorilla.

There are three known subspecies: Gorilla gorilla gorilla (also known as the 'western lowland gorilla'); Gorilla gorilla graueri (also known as the 'eastern lowland gorilla'); and Gorilla gorilla beringei (also known as the 'highland' or 'mountain' gorilla). This information can be found at McGrew, 1992, 42. Ruvolo, 1994, suggests that it may not be the case that all existing gorillas belong to the same species.

(2) Pan troglodytes (most commonly known as 'chimpanzees').

There are three known subspecies: Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii (eastern central Africa); Pan troglodytes troglodytes (central western Africa); and Pan troglodytes verus (far western Africa). McGrew, 1992, 23-27.

(3) Pan paniscus (known as bonobos and also, though inaccurately, 'pygmy chimpanzees').

(4) Pongo pygmaeus (orangutans).

The dominant view is that orangutans comprise two subspecies: Pongo pygmaeus pygmaeus (also known as the 'Borneo orang-utan'), and Pongo pygmaeus abelii (or 'Sumatran orang-utan'). McGrew, 1992, 42. There are, however, recent claims that these two populations may be more properly understood as two different species (see, for example, Chemnick, L., & Ryder, O., "Cytological and molecular divergence of orangutan subspecies", in J. J. Ogden, L.A. Perkins, and L. Sheeran (eds), Proceedings of the International Conference on Orangutans: The Neglected Ape (San Diego: Zoological Society of San Diego, 1994). pp. 74-78).

The first three species, together with humans, are referred to as 'African great apes' (Byrne, 1995, 21) and those four species, together with orangutans, are members of a slightly larger taxonomic group known as the 'great apes'. This group of five species, considered a separate superfamily (Hominoidea) (see, generally, Byrne, 1995) is, in turn, part of a much larger taxonomic group containing approximately 180 surviving species of animals more generally referred to as 'primates'. The larger group includes very diverse animals, including two superfamilies of monkeys (Ceboidea, Cercopithecoidea). The term 'monkey' is occasionally used for the great apes other than humans, but it is more precisely used for members of the Ceboidea and Cercopithecoidea superfamilies which can be identified easily because they have tails, whereas apes do not.

Pan troglodytes troglodytes are found in Guinea, Sierra Leone and several other West African countries. In Cameroon, Gabon, Congo and nearby states lives the 'pale-faced' or 'masked' chimpanzee P. t. verus. Further east in Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania is the eastern long-haired chimpanzee P.t. schweinfurthii and this has the largest population.

Pan paniscus inhabit northern Zaire.

Pongo pygmaeus pygmaeus live in northern Borneo (Sabah) and southern Borneo (Kalimantan). Pongo pygmaeus abelii live in Sumatra.

Gorilla gorilla gorilla live in Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic and Zaire.

Gorilla gorilla graueri live in eastern Zaire.

Gorilla gorilla beringei live in the in the rain forests of Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire.

Our knowledge of the other great apes is still relatively limited, with a lot of information only being acquired in the last three decades. Each great ape has a unique personality, and each has his or her own individual biography. They are highly intelligent, self-aware, have family bonds that last through life - a lifespan of up to sixty years. There is a long period of childhood dependency. Learning plays a very important part in the acquisition of adult behaviour. They have complex social structures. They use their minds very actively all the time. They continually have to make decisions, whom to travel with today, what to eat, where to go. There are examples of tool-using and tool-making behaviour in the wild, activities which at one time were thought to set humans apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. There is co-operation, and true altruism, which have been observed in the wild.

In 'Chimpanzees - Bridging the Gap', her contribution to The Great Ape Project, Jane Goodall relates the following story about "a chimpanzee being named Old Man":

"He was rescued from a lab when he was about twelve years old and went to Lion Country Safaris in Florida. There he was put, with three females, on an artificial island. All four had been abused. A young man, Marc Cusano, was employed to care for them. He was told not to get too close - the chimps hated people and were vicious. He should throw food to the island from his little boat. As the days went by Marc became increasingly fascinated by the human-like behaviour of the chimps. How could he care for them if he did not have some kind of relationship with them? He began going closer and closer. One day he held out a banana - Old Man took it from his hand. A few weeks later Marc dared to step onto the island. And then, on a never to be forgotten occasion, Old Man allowed Marc to groom him. They had become friends. Some time later, as Marc was clearing the island, he slipped, fell and scared the infant who had been born to one of the females. The infant screamed, the mother, instinctively, leapt to defend her child and bit Marc's neck. The other two females quickly ran to help their friend: one bit his wrist, the other his leg. And then Old Man came charging towards the scene - and that, thought Marc, was the end. But Old Man pulled each of those females off Marc and hurled then away, then kept them at bay while Marc, badly wounded, dragged himself to safety."

Section 3: Principles and Policies

The Declaration on Great Apes says: "We demand the extension of the community of equals to include all great apes: human beings, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orang-utans. The community of equals is the moral community within which we accept certain basic moral principles or rights as governing our relations with each other and enforceable at law. Among these principles or rights are the following: [ ]"

It then goes on to list and define the right to Life, protection of Individual Liberty and Freedom from Torture.

When people first hear the term 'the community of equals', they sometimes think 'equal' means 'the same', or that members of the 'community of equals' should be treated in exactly the same way. This is not true for humans, nor is it true for the other great apes.

For instance, considering human physiology and the strength of human arms, it would be absurd to insist that all humans should have an opportunity to live in trees. For orang-utans, however, with their greater strength and agility when off the ground, and their preference for living in trees, such a demand makes considerable sense.

When we include our fellow apes in the community of equals, we assert that they are our moral equals in the crucial areas of right to life, protection of freedom, and prohibition of torture. In so doing, we are directly challenging the assumption of a human right to dominance.

Peter Singer has said:

"We consider small children as members of the community of equals, even though we don't grant them the right to vote because that wouldn't really be meaningful. So when we talk about expanding the community of equals to include the great apes we mean that they should have the same fundamental rights that all human beings already have.

"I certainly don't mean that we should give equal treatment. I think that would be nonsense and we don't give equal treatment to all humans. We do regard children as needing to be treated differently, we do regard people with intellectual disabilities sometimes as needing to be treated differently, so it is really proceeding from a basic equal consideration and that they have certain basic rights." (Quoted in a booklet entitled Brute Sense, Channel Four Television in the UK, 1995)

The various species of orang-utans, gorillas, bonobos and chimpanzees are made up of individuals who can benefit from having their lives and fundamental freedoms protected. The Great Ape Project is contesting the view that the rights or interests of human beings should take precedence over those of the other great apes. We think it is unacceptable that the nonhuman great apes are treated as subordinate to humans, used as means for human ends, and as property.

A direct implication of this expansion of the community of moral equals is that gorillas, orang-utans, bonobos and chimpanzees have to be treated as individuals with their own lives, minds, emotions, relationships, needs and desires. And, as with different humans in their different ways, all these qualities are worthy of, and demand, respect.

The Great Ape Project defines a 'sanctuary' as an institution where the needs, interests and rights of the apes come first, and where the facilities, long-term financing, expertise and resources necessary to satisfy those needs, interests and rights are provided.

Wherever it is still possible for free apes to continue to live in their traditional habitats unmolested, they should be allowed to do so. Sadly, many apes cannot do this, either because their traditional habitat has been destroyed or because, as a result of their long captivity, they have lost or never developed the ability to live freely in the wild and/or might not be able to become resocialized. For such individuals, a sanctuary may be the best way to respect their basic rights. Once again, it is the interests of the individual concerned that should be considered.

We oppose the keeping of apes in situations designed primarily for the benefit of human beings who observe them (zoos). Wherever possible, great apes should be released from captivity into a habitat where they can live freely. When this is not possible, we accept as an interim measure the provision of sanctuaries for great apes who cannot be returned to natural conditions. Individuals living provisionally in these sanctuaries must have the opportunity to remove themselves from humans as they please, and humans visiting them should be educated in the right of apes to live their own lives.

We accept that, for reasons given above, or because they have been infected with a contagious disease, there may be some individuals who will never be able to live freely or in a group. In such cases, they should be provided with the space, facilities and opportunities for non-tactile interaction with others of their kind, or with humans, that best corresponds to their individual needs and interests.

A guardian or guardians should be appointed to represent the interests of nonhuman apes living in sanctuaries or other human-controlled environments. In particular cases, guardians may approve limitation of their fertility, so that apes will not have to live in unacceptable conditions indefinitely.

It must be decided in each case whether it is best for individual great apes to be brought to sanctuaries or to remain where they are. Considerations such as available housing, stress created by the presence of humans, and existing bonds with caretakers will affect this decision.

In the rare cases that they do remain in the zoo, because it is in their own best interests, the priority in the power relationship should be given to the interests of the nonhuman apes. If they can voluntarily place themselves in view of the public, there should be a sign clearly saying that these are the last generation of great apes in zoo captivity.

Should great apes remain in zoos, breeding should not be allowed, in order to avoid new-borns living in the same impoverished conditions. However, breeding in sanctuaries that are large enough to allow a great degree of freedom may be allowed.

We accept that it may be possible for some orang-utans, gorillas, bonobos or chimpanzees to live freely outside of their traditional home areas. This might be true, for instance, in a large area or sanctuary where the conditions could be considered to be as good as a natural habitat. Breeding might be ethically justifiable in this case, because the extinction of the species might be averted here without the affected individuals paying the costs.

Where a particular great ape (sub)species is on the verge of extinction, and there is a proposal that numbers be maintained by breeding in captivity, we will campaign to raise money for excellent sanctuaries where breeding will not lead to great apes being born into captivity.

We do not advocate 'policing' of great apes in the wild as this would be an unacceptable intervention in their lives. This does not exclude occasional human involvement in resolving individual situations.

Humans have no moral prerogative to 'own' the entire surface of the earth. In the 'protected territories' the rights of apes, and perhaps other animals, would no longer be subordinate to those of humans.

There is considerable historical experience of the United Nations acting as a protector of non-autonomous human regions, known as United Nations Trust Territories. It is to an international body of this kind that the defence of the first nonhuman independent territories could be entrusted.

Yes, if the re-introduction is in the best interests of the individuals involved.

Several gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos and orang-utans have already learned to use sign language, and it may be in their best interests to continue to communicate by sign. Voluntary learning of sign language in sanctuaries may also be a benefit, through increasing communication across species.

This should only take place if it clearly confers an advantage on the nonhuman great apes themselves, and if it can be guaranteed that they will not later be deprived of the possibility of communicating by sign language.

Teaching of sign language to great apes in natural settings would usually represent an unwarranted human interference.

The moral guidelines for the protection of vulnerable humans should be applied to our fellow great apes. To these should be added consideration of the various stresses caused by transporting some of the other great apes out of a familiar environment to a strange one, away from the other members of their community.

Portrayal of the other great apes as 'comic' sub-humans continues the exploitation to which they have so often been subjected. It imposes human values on them and treats them as objects.

They have their own cultures and individual qualities, which have already been ignored for too long. They deserve to be recognised as individuals with their own lives.

To the objection that chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orang-utans will be unable to defend their own claims within the community of equals, we respond that human guardians should safeguard their interests and rights, in the same ways as the interests of young or intellectually disabled members of our own species are safeguarded.

Wherever a decision is made affecting the interests of some of the other great apes, a human guardian or advocate who has no conflict of interest, and who has the relevant expertise, should be appointed to represent them, and to speak on their behalf.

At present, only humans benefit from the right to life, protection of individual liberty, and the prohibition of torture, as recognised in laws and international conventions. In this limited sense, these are 'human' rights, but that does not imply that they cannot be extended to other species.

The demand that these 'human rights' be extended to all the great apes would thus make them 'great ape rights'.

Saying that humans should have 'human' rights does not necessarily imply that all humans are the same. And we are not saying that the other great apes are humans. They are extraordinary, complex individuals, regardless of the label that humans apply to them. But we are saying that both human and nonhuman great apes, as individuals, each in their own way, deserve the benefit of the fundamental moral protections which -- until now -- have been considered exclusively 'human' rights.

The concept of human rights has been very successful. It has provided a clear way of defining the minimum of moral treatment that humans should be able to expect. It has now come to underlie a great deal of the debate about how individual humans should, or should not, be treated. Once humans recognise that they are not the only beings whose world and experience are important, then there is no good reason why a similar approach should not apply outside of the human domain.

People sometimes complain to us that we are seeking to extend rights to the rest of the great apes when not all humans have their rights respected. The clear implication here is that it would be a good thing if rights were respected for all humans. We agree. But we challenge the idea that the other great apes should only have their rights respected once all humans have this protection. Such a delay would be as unreasonable as withholding rights from one group of humans until the most privileged human group had all of its rights recognised. It is clear that our fellow great apes could benefit from legislative recognition that they, too, merit these basic rights. Given the proven worth of the 'human' rights paradigm, how can anyone still refuse to extend it even to one non-human creature?

It is strange to think that the protection of life and liberty, and freedom from torture might be essential only for humans. If we look at the actions and communications of other species - in this instance our fellow apes - we see that:

1) they make enormous efforts to preserve their own life,

2) they will run, struggle and fight to keep their liberty, and

3) they will at times do almost anything to avoid having pain inflicted upon them.

So, why should they not be protected?

Thus, if we look at the way some humans treat non-human great apes - hunting and killing, imprisoning and brutalising them, destroying their habitats and sources of food - we can see that these others would benefit greatly if allowed to live free from human interference, and free from the physical, mental and emotional pain to which humans have so often subjected them.

Humans who spend much time with the other great apes, including the contributors to the book "The Great Ape Project", often see them as persons. They come to recognise that orang-utans, gorillas, chimpanzees and bonobos are individuals, with their own mental and emotional histories (biographies) based on their experience and on their assimilation of that experience into their personal view of the world.

'Person' is a peculiar term (and concept). Although it is often employed as if it meant the same as 'human being', the origin of the word 'person' is in the Latin term for a mask worn by an actor in classical drama. By putting on masks, the actors signified that they were acting a part. Later on, 'person' came to mean one who plays a role in life, one who is an agent. It is also used in theology to refer to beings who are not human, for example, the 'three persons of the Trinity'.

According to the Oxford Dictionary, one of the current meanings of 'person' is "a self-conscious or rational being". This sense has impeccable philosophical precedents. The seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke defines a person as a "thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places". (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter 9, Paragraph 29)

Person is also a term which plays a strongly evaluative role. Since it refers to the possession of characteristics that are generally seen as morally relevant, such as rationality and self-consciousness, it is often used to ascribe moral properties -- usually some rights or duties, and frequently the right to life -- to the beings so denominated. For example, at law, a corporation can be a person.

Thus, the collective case for granting the status of persons to chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orang-utans presented in The Great Ape Project provides the support of a strong philosophical tradition for the request for their inclusion in the community of equals.

To be a person is the opposite of being a thing, or property.

What we know about the characteristics of our co-great apes is sufficient to grant them the status of persons according to the traditional philosophical definition of the term. This requires that they be granted the special protections and rights that are accepted as being warranted by personhood. It means a radical shift - from their current status of property to the moral and legal status of persons.

Section 4: Objections

The objection has been raised that, since it focuses solely on our fellow great apes, the Great Ape Project is still anthropocentric, and hence 'speciesist' in its attitude. The moral and practical reasons behind this focus are as follows.

The Great Ape Project seeks to establish "certain basic moral principles or rights" for nonhuman great apes. These would protect life and liberty, and guarantee freedom from torture. The idea that these principles or rights should apply exclusively to members of the species Homo Sapiens forms what has been called the 'species barrier'. This was an artificial and morally bankrupt notion from the beginning. The species barrier is a powerful element in both religious and secular thinking, and is responsible for untold suffering inflicted by humans on other animals.

The Great Ape Project is not seeking to move the species barrier simply to re-erect it in another place, but to demolish it altogether. This would allow moral decisions to be made on valid grounds, and not for irrelevant reasons of species membership.

The Great Ape Project is arguing for the inclusion of our fellow great apes in the "community of equals" not because they are human-like, but rather because they possess a variety of characteristics which are morally relevant. These characteristics, such as complex emotional life, strong social and family bonds, and self-awareness, have a great moral weight not because most humans have them too, but because they are morally relevant in themselves.

The individual needs and interests that arise out of these characteristics are currently ignored, and even arrogantly denied, by most human legal and moral systems. In fact, the nonhuman great apes are commonly used as mere instruments, tools and property by humans. The Great Ape Project is committed to remedying this moral blindness. This requires recognition of the interests of those great apes compelled to live in human-enforced captivity, as well as of those still fortunate enough to live 'in the wild' relatively free of human domination, and whose greatest need is simply to be left alone to live in their own ways.

But why just the great apes? Because we need to start somewhere. And with the nonhuman great apes irrefutable scientific evidence is available now to show that they are complex individuals with equally complex interests. Thus, in the case of the other great apes, the entrenched habit of human exclusiveness can be challenged on specific, scientifically demonstrable grounds. Some of these grounds are set out in the articles by leading scientists, philosophers and other scholars included in the book that launched the Great Ape Project.

The Great Ape Project focuses on great apes not because they are the only morally considerable animals, but rather because their rich individuality, combined with their dire predicament, makes them one of the most obvious cases for challenging the claim that membership of the human species is the only basis for moral standing. As the Declaration on Great Apes says, "No doubt some of us, speaking individually, would want to extend the community of equals to many other animals as well ...". But the Great Ape Project - seeing itself as a link between theory and practice - cannot ignore the specific structures and mechanisms of the real world if it wants to make practical moral progress.

It is the essence of the Project not to make any compromise concerning how much we demand - that is, we are demanding the three most basic rights that all humans possess - but, for this very reason, we have to limit the range of those for whom we are demanding so much. This has led us away from the traditional attitude of asking for a little for all towards one of asking everything for some. This goal, being revolutionary rather than reformist in nature, will establish a precedent for many other animals. Whether or not every animal is immediately included in the community of equals, in the longer term, breaking down the rigidity of the 'us' and 'them' distinction will have benefits for all.

This is the case because the Great Ape Project is challenging the assumptions made by a biased, prejudiced human mind. In this sense, the nonhuman great apes will also act as a vanguard for other oppressed beings.

It is sometimes objected that the nonhuman great apes cannot have rights because they are incapable of taking on the concomitant duties or responsibilities.

We respond by saying that lots of humans have rights without responsibilities. I do not feel a moral responsibility to a child because they are capable of treating me in a moral way in return, but because of what I know, or assume, about the child's mind, feelings etc. If someone falls over and hurts themself in the street, I do not go to help them because I expect them to do anything for me in return. I do it because their situation demands it of me. If a dog is hurt, we feel that those present should help if they can, regardless of the dog's ability to return the favour. Thus, responsibilties are not the basis for having rights, and neither are rights the basis for having responsibilities. It is not rights that bring moral responsibility, but power combined with the ability to make a choice.

It is our power to affect the other great apes that says we have a responsibility to treat them fairly. The reason that we are considering how we should treat them at all is that it is we humans who have brought them into our sphere of existence. We have intervened in their world. We thus have a responsibility to treat them according to their needs and interests, regardless of their ability to help us in return.

It can also be questioned whether any system that only confers responsibilities when they are reciprocated by rights can be considered to incorporate the altruism that is part of most practical moralities.

'Anthropomorphism' is the mistaken attribution of human attributes to a nonhuman. Those who see the nonhuman great apes as having a variety of characteristics in common with humans are sometimes accused of anthropomorphism.

The first question to be asked, however, is: Are these characteristics solely found in humans, or are they also present in the rest of the great apes? If a characteristic is found in humans and not in our fellow apes, then the attribution of it to nonhuman great apes is anthropomorphism. If a characteristic is present in the other great apes, then the informed attribution of it to these other great apes is not anthropomorphism, but realism. So, the argument underlying the charge of anthropomorphism assumes its own conclusion without proving its point. I.e. it begs the question.

Many humans feel a great deal of respect and affection for their fellow great apes, and yet they would hesitate to enshrine those attitudes in law. They seem to feel that this would somehow 'lower' the status of humans.

By enshrining the basic rights of all the great apes, both human and non-human in the law we are not lowering the status of humans; but we are raising the moral status of the rest of the great apes to the current moral status of humans. This could only be demeaning for those humans who take it for granted that our great ape peers are morally inferior to humans. But this is exactly what the Great Ape Project has shown to be untrue.

Humans merit respect specifically because of their own characteristics. This 'status' will not be raised or lowered by a recognition of the various characteristics of other creatures. (The height, location and nature of Mount Everest are unaffected by the taking of measurements of other mountains. Even the discovery that another mountain is higher than Everest would not make Everest any lower, or easier to climb.)

Furthermore, experience tells us that respect and affection are not finite resources. Far from it. The amount of respect and affection in the world can be increased without reducing the level accorded to humans.

The view that humans and other animals are somehow in competition for respect of their rights also assumes that humans are somehow separate from the rest of nature, and that we will lose out in some way if the rest of nature is valued more highly. Those of us living in industrialised societies, in particular, have recently come to see how we are very much part of, and dependent on, the rest of nature. (There are societies that have never forgotten this.)

There is a principle of continuity that links us to all living beings. Ignoring this connection really does constitute a threat to the survival and 'dignity' of various animals, both human and non-human.

There is a natural connection between ethics and action. Ethics and practice are closely linked. It is very hard to have one without the other.

Part of the value of ethical thinking is that it has practical implications. If the Great Ape Project's ethical arguments prove effective, then they will be reflected in practice in the treatment of all great apes, human or otherwise.

Most forms of human practice imply assumptions about the ethical concerns involved. In this sense almost all practice has a 'theoretical', ethical component.

Most human actions take place within a particular 'ethical climate', or against a background of certain assumptions. The current ethical climate permits humans to treat their fellow great apes as property, disregarding their personal interests.

The Great Ape Project is seeking to change the ethical assumptions we make about what we can, and can not, do to our great ape peers. This change has far-reaching practical implications. And human practice will probably never change unless our assumptions change first.

Some Practical Successes

The Great Ape Project inspired the American ABC network program on Booee, a chimpanzee who had spent 14 years in a basement laboratory, but still remembered Roger Fouts, who had taught him sign language so many years before. The program led to the release of Booee and 8 other chimpanzees from the same laboratory. They are now in a sanctuary in California.

Our coordinator in Taiwan has worked to rescue neglected orphan orangutans, imported from Borneo to Taiwan as pets, but often locked up in cruel conditions when they become too big and strong to be kept in the house.

The Great Ape Project motivated the making and showing of The Great Ape Trial on UK television, in which a distinguished independent panel voted that the law should be changed to give our closest living relatives - chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans - the right to life, the right to liberty, freedom from torture.

We helped make the American public aware of the illegal but widespread hunting of chimpanzees and gorillas in Africa, to be sold as 'bushmeat', a luxury commodity that is the biggest single threat to existing wild populations of great apes.

Various forms of 'intelligence', the ability to plan for the future, the capacity to comprehend complex forms of culture, and so on may provide a plausible basis for the attribution of certain rights. And those who have these qualities may well merit moral consideration specifically because of that fact. But, among humans, the possession of these qualities is not usually taken as grounds for having greater rights than others. A lot of human rights are specifically allocated regardless of the skills and intelligence of the holder.

And, even for those who consider superior intelligence, the ability to make moral decisions, to plan for the future, etc. as in some way generating special interests and needs which would have to be especially protected by certain rights, that would not necessarily entail a right to interfere with, dominate, or exploit others who don't have these capacities. Otherwise, listening to Bach and planning to have a rich life might entitle you to enslave humans who do not or cannot undertake such mental activities.

No one characteristic could form the basis for all moral consideration, as various beings have a variety of morally relevant traits. It is necessary to look at each individual, consider what they are like, what their moral needs and interests are, and respect those.

In the same way as a change in the status of the nonhuman great apes is likely to have implications for other nonhuman animals, the immense amount of work done on establishing the ethical status of humans also has implications for other animals, perhaps especially for the other great apes.

The traditional distinction that humans make between themselves and other animals has been exaggerated. This exaggeration is one of the sources of the radically different treatment accorded to humans and nonhumans.

The Great Ape Project is seeking to breach the species barrier both from within and without. We are seeking to expand the 'moral circle', so that ethical value is accorded to more than just humans. But we are also seeking to show that, even with the current narrow assumptions, some animals already qualify for inclusion in the moral community. Many humans deny their fellow great apes rights or respect for their interests. One reason they give for this is that these other great apes lack various qualities -- intelligence, self-awareness, emotion and significant sensitivity to pain -- that would have to be taken into account in any fair system of ethics. They argue that 'they are not like us'.

And yet, recent research has shown that nonhuman great apes have various of the qualities and abilities that were previously thought to belong exclusively to humans. These include self-awareness, language skills, tool use, problem solving and planning for the future, memory of others as individuals, rich emotional lives and relationships, intelligence and sensitivity.

One necessary part of the Great Ape Project's argument has thus been to point out that the differences between human and nonhuman great apes have been exaggerated in order to widen the apparent gulf between 'us' and 'animals'. This needs to be said primarily in order to do justice to the true natures of the rest of the great apes. It is further necessary in order to refute the arguments that allow our co-great apes to be treated as unfeeling objects and as property.

The similarity-to-humans argument is a way of challenging human prejudice about the rest of the great apes, rather than an attempt to say that nonhuman great apes are human. The other great apes merit respect and fair treatment in their own right, regardless of their similarity to humans.

The fact that some of the other great apes (and many other animals) have some capacities equal to or greater than those of some humans is an important psychological blow against human chauvinism. Our referring to these common traits does not mean that we accept human chauvinism. It rather shows that human chauvinism is unjustified. (And even human chauvinists will logically have to admit the rights of the other great apes.)

The similarity-to-humans argument is not rooted in the 'humanness' of the qualities in question. Humans have rights and interests that have to be respected because of their specific qualities, ability to feel pain, etc., not because they are human. Some of those same reasons apply to the rest of the great apes.

The similarity-to-humans argument is a form of shorthand, which allows large areas of ethical argument to be taken for granted. The logic of it is as follows:

1. Humans have rights/interests that have to be respected.

2. The nonhuman great apes are like humans in various morally significant ways.

3. Therefore, insofar as human and nonhuman great apes are similar, the nonhuman great apes have rights/interests that have to be respected.

This is a simple and clear approach that avoids the long, complex process of establishing the philosophical basis for (human) rights/respect for interests, since people generally already accept (1) anyway.

This argument leaves aside situations in which other great apes require greater consideration than humans do. For instance, nonhuman great apes who are moved away from their familiar environment to a strange one, away from the other members of their community, or whose home environment is disrupted in some way, are likely to suffer greater stress than many humans would in similar circumstances.

Although the fate and ethical status of any great apes, human or otherwise, should not be dependent on what 'we' know about 'them', in practice the argument often has to be conducted on that basis. The great similarities between the nonhuman great apes and humans mean that we know more about how they feel, think, etc. than we do about some other species. Because of the many characteristics we have in common, we can be more sure of what they are like.

Section 5: Additional Information

The Great Ape Project has supporters from many walks of life in over 30 nations all over the world: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Uganda and the United States.

Opposition to the Project comes mainly from those groups or individuals who themselves expect to benefit from maintaining the status of the other great apes as property. I.e. parts of the scientific community in general, and institutions or individual experimenters, zoo keepers, etc., in particular, who use great apes in various ways, either for personal benefit or for some alleged benefit to humanity.

There is also a strand of opposition based on ideological grounds. These grounds range from theological positions, which see humans alone as being made in the image of God, and thus as the pinnacle of creation, to more secular versions of this tradition, which make typically humanist claims that all humans have a special dignity or worth that is possessed by no other living being.

Articles and reviews have appeared in:

(United Kingdom)
New Scientist (6.6.93)
The Times (7.6.93)
The Guardian (17.6.93), (1.5.95)
The Observer (20.6.93)
The Financial Times (3.7.93), (4.9.93), (13.5.95)
The Independent (15.6.93), (11.7.93)
The Times Literary Supplement (17.9.93)
Nature (15.7.93)
BBC Wildlife (6/93)

(USA)
The Washington Post (30.1.94)
The San Francisco Chronicle (20.2.94)
The New York Times Magazine (1.5.94)
San Diego Union Tribune (26.1.94), (27.2.94)
The New York Times Book Review (1.6.94)
Outside (10/93)
Genetic Engineering News (19.11.93)
Discover (2/94)
Science (22.4.94)

(Australia)
The Canberra Times
The Australian (14.7.93)

(Canada)
Vancouver Sun (18.9.93)

(Italy)
L'Indice
La Stampa (9.6.93)
Il Giorno (12.6.93)
La Repubblica (17.6.93), (24.11.94)
Il Venerdi di Repubblica (25.11.94)
Le Scienze (6/94)

(Finland)
Helsingin Sanomat (29.10.94)

(France)
Science & Vie (1/95), (5/95)
Courrier International (13.7.95)
Science & Avenir (?)

(Germany)
Der Spiegel (5.7.93)
Focus (12.9.94)
Frankfurter Rundschau (20.9.93), (5.10.94)
Emma (6/94)
Abenteuer Natur (2/95)
Die Woche (31.3.95)
Geo (4/95)
Hannoversche Allgemeine (7.2.96)
Neue Presse (7.2.96)
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (13./14.4.96)

(China)
China Daily (21.8.93)

(The Netherlands)
De Volkskrant (7.5.94)
Elsevier (15.4.95)

6. Supporting the Great Ape Project.

Sign the Declaration on Great Apes.

See the GAP & You section for practical steps to support the Great Ape Project.

Write or e-mail the Great Ape Project.

Download it from the Great Ape Project Web Site at http://www.envirolink.org/orgs/gap/gapfaq.html.
Write to your local Great Ape Project coordinator.

Yes. Please feel free to copy and distribute it for non-commercial purposes.
The copyright belongs to The Great Ape Project - International.

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